

The reader will derive an erroneous opinion of the reviewer's estimate of the value of this book, if he focuses upon the detailed criticisms that have preceded. What errors the book contains are those that the best of scholars fall into some time or other; they do not seriously mar either the usefulness or the permanent value of what is undoubtedly a notable contribution to demography.

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PSYCHOLOGY

Aldrich, C. R. *The Primitive Mind and Modern Civilization.* London, 1931. Kegan Paul. Pp. xvii+249+18. Price 18s.

MR. ALDRICH has written a very readable and, comparatively speaking, a sound and sober discussion of primitive mentality. I say 'comparatively speaking,' for this is a field in which authors are apt to indulge their speculative fancy without restraint. Mr. Aldrich rejects wholeheartedly the most celebrated of the fanciful systems, those of Freud and Levy Bruhl. The former is dismissed summarily, and to the refutation of the latter he devotes considerable space; perhaps not without reason, since the doctrines of the school seem still to enjoy a considerable vogue, in spite of their manifest absurdity. It is true that the author makes use of the expression 'collective representations,' but he waters it down to mean nothing more than "an orthodox conventional point of view." In rejecting the speculations of Freud and of the Durlubuin school, Mr. Aldrich is manifesting not his independence, but rather his discipleship to another great authority whose views are widely regarded as no less fanciful than those of Freud and Levy Bruhl, namely C. G. Jung.

The merit of the book is that it seeks to apply modern psychology to the problems of primitive society; its weakness is that it applies a very specialized psychology, the

"analytical psychology" of Dr. Jung, modified by the influence of Mr. Wilfred Trotter. Aldrich's psychology may be described as Jung-cum-Trotter; that is to say, he seeks to solve all the problems by aid of Jung's "collective Unconscious" (with its archetypes) and of Trotter's "herd instinct"; and, of course, working with two such powerful solvents, he finds no problem insoluble. Yet in so far as Trotter's solvent is used, the solutions are (as with Trotter) largely factitious. Thus, the main teaching of the book is summarized as follows:

"The race tends to progress from unconsciousness toward consciousness and during this progression three stages may be seen: first, an unconscious bi-morality, in which the primitive members of any social group co-operate instinctively; second, a period of savagery, in which the rise of egotistic tendencies requires that the group shall force the members to conform to a norm of conventional morality; and third, a stage . . . in which members of the group consciously co-operate for the common good, and consciously restrain their egotistic desires in order to do so. The psychic life history of every individual who reaches full individuality passes through these three phases of psychic development."

Now, allowing for the peculiar sense in which the word 'conscious' is used by the author (namely, as meaning clear, critical self-consciousness) this may be a true account. But the author claims to explain the succession of the three stages; and he explains the first stage by the dominance of the herd or social instinct (which, following Trotter, he makes responsible for every form of social activity); the second stage by the rise of self-consciousness; the third by the renewed dominance of the herd instinct, *in spite of* further accentuation of self-consciousness and individuality. The implication would seem to be that in the third stage of racial and individual development the 'herd instinct' somehow and for some obscure reason becomes very much

stronger than in the first and second stages. Lest it be thought that I do injustice to Mr. Aldrich, I cite again :

" I believe this to be the general course of man's psychic evolution : he begins with unconsciousness, when he is bi-moral simply because the instinct to co-operate is stronger than any other instinct : he becomes imperfectly conscious, whereupon anti-social, egotistical urges appear, and make it necessary for the group to establish and enforce norms of conduct, or conventions ; and more and more he will approach full consciousness, full individuation, and full individual self-control and responsibility. And as he does this—as the race itself becomes adult—the necessity for being morally controlled from without will progressively disappear."

And in explanation of this third stage he writes : " The simple fact is that we have lost none of our primitive instincts, and that we experience a relief from nervous tension and an ensuing tranquillity and feeling of self-satisfaction whenever we have given one of them due expression ; that is true of the instinct to eat, to sleep, to wake, to play, and the sex-instinct, and it is no less true in regard to allowing an outlet for that instinct which subordinates all the others, the social or symbiotic instinct of co-operation with one's fellows."

Our author's acceptance of Trotter's lead throws, then, no real light upon his main problem. What of the Jungian doctrine in his hands? Of Jung's doctrine of the collective or racial unconscious it must be unreservedly acknowledged that it is very illuminating, that it does throw much light on primitive mentality as also on our sophisticated selves, *if it be true*. But is it true? Mr. Aldrich does not stop to ask the question ! He does not use Jung's doctrine as a working hypothesis to be tested and proved in application to specific problems. Rather, he simply registers himself as a disciple of Jung, and, like the master himself, seems to have no doubts or ques-

tioning about the literal truth of the doctrine. Of Jung's doctrine it must also be said that, unlike those of Freud and Levy Bruhl, it cannot be refuted by showing it to be internally inconsistent or in conflict with indisputable facts. It may be true ; but it remains highly questionable, and requires for its establishment a vastly greater array of evidence than has yet been adduced.

In one respect our author's position is superior to Jung's. Jung's doctrine of the racial unconsciousness and its many archetypal modes of thinking implies that Lamarckian 'transmission of acquired characters' can only be true if the effects of use are transmitted and accumulated from generation to generation. Now Jung (and the same is true of Freud who has of late years made increasing use of similar assumptions) never explicitly admits this implication. Mr. Aldrich does recognize it and makes it explicit. But he is not troubled by the fact that the bulk of expert biological opinion stoutly denies Lamarckian transmission. Like Freud and Jung, he blandly ignores this awkward state of affairs. He writes, in flat contradiction of the truth :

" It is not doubted that an act which by the narrowest possible definition must be taken as instinctive (as a baby's sucking the breast) results from the fact that generation after generation infants have done this, so that a habit has been established in the race." And " It would be a strain upon common sense to suppose that the universal, almost infinite repetition of such experiences has not left imprints upon human nature, has not greatly moulded human nature in fact."

It is surely a profoundly unsatisfactory state of science, when two such leaders as Freud and Jung and all their many disciples can base their teaching upon a biological principle which the great majority of biologists repudiate, a principle the acceptance of which would profoundly transform biology. Surely it is for them to marshal their evidence of inborn com-

plexes, of inborn horror of incest, of archetypes, and so forth, as evidence supporting the Lamarckian hypothesis, rather than to continue magisterially to assume the truth of that hypothesis as though it had never been questioned.

The failure of Mr. Aldrich to find any satisfactory explanation of his third stage of human development, that of autonomous morality and unconstrained social service, is due to his ignoring of one great feature of individual and social development, namely the growth of the sentiments, especially the moral sentiments, and their perpetuation and propagation in the form of the moral tradition of a society impressed in some degree upon all its members. So long as this great feature is ignored, some such doctrine as Jung's collective unconscious forces itself upon us; for "the collective Unconscious" is essentially a system of inborn sentiments. But if the moral tradition is fully recognized, together with its subtle power to mould the individual, then we have much less need to postulate "the racial Unconscious"; it remains an interesting hypothesis, one not to be summarily rejected, but not one imperatively required by undeniable facts.

It was open to Mr. Aldrich, assuming, as he does, the truth of the Lamarckian principle, to explain his third stage of development as due to the social discipline of his second stage having forced social conduct upon successive generations until at last such forms of conduct have become in some measure innate in the race. But he does not carry his Lamarckism through to this point, although this is implicit in the teaching of his master, Jung.

The book contains short introductions by Dr. Jung and Professor Malinowski. The fact that two such distinguished authorities warmly commend a book containing the grave defects here pointed out, emphasizes the reflection made above, namely, the rudimentary and chaotic condition of our sciences of man and of society. And Professor Malinowski's remarks emphasize this in another way. He holds that anthropology and psychology are distinct spheres, and

that in between them lies a No-man's-land not yet occupied, but perhaps destined to be the field of a distinct science. Would it not be true to say that these so-called sciences are not in any sense spheres, but rather merely small patches of one vast region, the particular patches at whose ragged edges little groups of scientists are nibbling without any view of the whole region? Is it not time to demand that the anthropologist shall be at the same time a psychologist, and, equally, that the psychologist shall be an anthropologist? Mr. Aldrich sets us an excellent example, except in so far as he is content to be an "analytical psychologist."

WILLIAM McDougall.

SEX AND SOCIETY

Ellis, Havelock. *More Essays of Love and Virtue.* London, 1931. Constable. Pp. 218. Price 7s. 6d.

I WAS sorry to read in a recent number of the *EUGENICS REVIEW* that I had passed 'an unqualified condemnation' on Mr. Havelock Ellis's *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*. I was sorry, because there is no writer on sociology with whose general outlook I am in more sympathy than Mr. Ellis, and I think there is no one who has done more courageous and valuable work in the cause of social hygiene. What I really said was that since it seems to be a psychological fact that even a colourless description of vices actually committed is more tainting to the mind than the literary products of a voluptuous imagination, the censorship was probably right in preventing a book which abounds in such descriptions from reaching the general public. The learned work referred to has, I believe, been very useful to psychiatrists and others who are obliged to study these disagreeable subjects. I certainly did not express "unqualified condemnation."

Mr. Ellis would not agree with me, for he wishes to abolish the censorship altogether. Here I think he is wrong. Let him go to a public library, and compare the virginal